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1. Introduction 
Observation equivalence was introduced in [7]. It has become recognised as a 
fundamental notion in the theory of concurrency, for a number of reasons. 
(i) Firstly, it has a natural mathematical-logical character (cf. ‘Ehrenfeucht 
Games’ [6] and also Aczel’s work [ 21). 
(ii) It corresponds to a very natural modal logic on transition systems, also 
introduced in [ 7]-‘ Hennessy-Milner Logic’ or HML. 
(iii) It seems to be the finest extensional behavioural equivalence one would want 
to impose-i.e., it incorporates all distinctions which could reasonably be made by 
external observation. 
As against this, objections have been made to observation equivalence on the 
grounds that it goes beyond those distinctions that can really be made by an observer, 
and is therefore too fine; also, that it is dubious on grounds of effectiveness or 
constructivity. Quite a number of much coarser equivalences have been proposed, 
e.g., [4]. Among these, the tmting equivalences of [5] have been explicitly based on 
a framework of extracting information about a system by testing it. These testing 
equivalences are indeed much weaker than observation equivalence in terms of the 
discriminations they are able to make. Similar comments apply to the refusal testing 
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nf [IO], which considerably extends the power of De Nicola-Hennessy testing while 
remaining in the same framework, but still falls far short of observation equivalence. 
This leaves open the question of the extent o which observation equivalence can 
be put on a testing basis, and also the profile of the terrain between testing equivalence 
and observation equivalence. That is, what kinds of increments to the power of 
testing are needed to obtain observation equivalence, if indeed this equivalence can 
be put on a testing basis at all. 
The aim of the present paper is to provide some answer3 to these questions. We 
shall develop a notion of testing which incorporates a hierarchy of increasingly 
powerful constructs: traces, refusals, copying and global testing. This notion of 
testing is formalised in two different ways: ‘denotationally’, by induction on the 
structure of tests and using some operators on the domain of outcomes of tests; 
and ‘operationally’, via a transition system. These two definitions are shown to 
coincide. Then we prove our main result: the equivalence based on ww notion of 
testing is exactly observation equivalence. 
2. Transition systems 
We begin by reviewing some basic ideas and notations. We shall be following [9] 
rather closely in the content, if not always the form, of our definitions. The reader 
is referred to that paper for background and motivation. 
Definition 2.1. A labelled transition system (with divergence) is a structure (Q, A, 6, t) 
where 
Q is a set of states, agents or processes; 
0 A is a set of atomic actions or experiments; 
e 6 : Q x A + 2Q is the transition function ; 
and t c Q is the divergence predicate. 
We write 
p+=qE~(p,a) 
to be read “p performs a and becomes q”; 
PFPQ 
to be read “p may diverge”; 
pb1Cpt) 
to be read “p converges”. 
Two-important properties which transition systems 
(i) Image-finiteness : 
WaEA.WpEQ. {qEQlp+“q} is finite. 
may possess are: 
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(ii) Sort-finiteness: 
tlp~ Q. {aEAl%EA*.p J +Q} is finite 
wherefors=a,...a,,p+“+“=3p ,,..., p,,,q.p--*aIp,+a2*. . *% Pn *a q* 
Now, given a transition system (Q, A, S, f), we define a family of relations c,, 
over Q as follows: 
p to q always; 
P LI+14 = VaeA. 
(Wp’. p +ap’ ==3 3q’. q +a q’ & p’ E, q’ 
& Pi --r, 
I 
(9 4-4 & 
(ii) Wq’. 4 +a q’ * 3P’. P +‘P’ & P’ Cn 4’); 
pCOq=Vn.pE,q. 
Then LO is the observationaf preorder on (Q, A, 6, t). It is clearly refIexive and 
transitive; the associated equivalence, 
is observational equivalence. 
Given a set of actions A, we now define a modal logic for talking about behaviours 
built from these actions. This is Hennessy-Mifner fogic (HML). 
The syntax of HML is 
Given a transition system (Q, A, 6, j’), we now define a satisfacticn relation p I= 4 
between processes p E Q and formulas 4 E HML. 
P’=T = true, 
P I= Cal4 = pi and VP’. p +aprap’ t= 4, 
Pt= (44 = 3p’.p +ap%prl= 4. 
Remark. This is not exactly the definition given in [9], but it is equivalent, at least 
for our purposes. 
Definition. Aff(p)={4~HMLlpl= 4). 
odal Characterisation 
(Q, A, 6, t) is sort-jnite, then 
([9], sharpened version). If the transition system 
vp,q~Q. pg”q e Aff(p)EAff(q). 
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We now consider transition systems built up in a certain way, which is a straightfor- 
ward generalisation of the definition of observation equivalence over CCS. 
Assume we are given a basic transition system B = ( 
We now wish to regard T as unobservable. We therefore define a derioed transition 
system D = (Q, A v (E, 6, j’) as follows: 
(i) p+q f p+T*+pq; a(p,a)={qlp+q} 
(ii) p+q = p+‘*q; 5(p,E)={q\p*‘q}. 
(iii) pt = (3q. p + q & qtO) v p d “, 
For the rest of this paper, we shall assume we are working over some given 
sort-finite basic transition system B = (Q, A u (T}, SO, to). We then let the observation 
preorder EO and the HML satisfaction relation t= be defined over the deriued 
transition system D = (Q, A u {E), 6, t). Note that sort-finiteness of B implies that 
of D; hence, the Modal Characterisation Theorem holds for D. 
emark. All our work will thus be done in ‘syntax-free’ form over an arbitrary 
ansition system. Note that the sorr-finiteness condition holds for CCS (at least if 
mild restrictions are imposed on t e renaming operation), while neither of the 
conditions in Milner’s statement of the Modal Characterisation Theorem in [9] do. 
emark. We have followed [9] l our definitions since that paper addresses the 
experimental and effective cant of observation equivalence with a depth and 
explicitness not found elsewhere in the literature. However, the approach we are 
about to develop could b& qppliei ~0 other variants of observation equivalence; see 
the last section of this papee. 
3. 
We begin with some preliminary notions about refusals, (cf [9]). 
itio 
prefa = p&)&p e2Lp +a. 
. If p aa and pJ, then 3~‘. p + p’ & p’ ref a. 
efme a sequence {p,,} as follows: p. = p. If pn %‘, the sequence stops at pn. 
that pn +?P~+~. If this sequ 
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e now UTI to the notion of outcorrne of a test. Foliowing [S], we take outcomes 
of particular runs of a test to be success or failure, represented as elements of the 
two-point domain: 
T 
. 
Q= I 
T 
Thus this notion of ‘failure’ incorporates divergence. Since processes are nondeter- 
ministic, there may be many di$erent runs of a given test on a process; hence, sets 
of outcomes are required to give the results of all possible runs. 
We are therefore led to use a powerdomain construction [ll]. There are in fact 
three standard powerdomain constructions: the Hoare powerdomain, incorporating 
may information; the Smyth powerdomain, incorporating must information and the 
Plotkin powerdomain, which combines both sorts of information (see, e.g., [ 1,131. 
For the simple case of the two-point domain, these three constructions can be 
represented explicitly as follows: 
{T) = (1, -J-j (J-1 
44~1 i P,[QI [ 
. 
Ul {;)=(I,T) 
{T) 
It will turn out to be essential to use both may and must information to obtain a 
correspondence with observation equivalence, so we shall use the Plotkin power- 
domain, which henceforth will be written just as P[O]. 
We now consider operations over this powerdomain. Note that forflni?e domains, 
monotone functions are automatically continuous and computable. 
1. Linear operations 
Given any monotone function f: 0” + 44 (n > 0), there is the pointwise xtension 
ff : (P[O])” + (P[O]) defined by 
t f( *,...,x")={f(X*,...,X,)~XiE 
This is obviously monotone. Such operations are said to be (multi)linear because 
they preserve union in each argument separately: 
f(X ,,..., x:L,X~ ,..., X*)=r’( 
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We shall be interested in two such operations in particular, those arising from the 
binary operations A, v on 0 defined as in the tables of Fig. 1. 
By abuse of notation, we shall write the pointwise extensions of these operations 
as A, v also. These have the tables shown in Fig. 2. 
2. Nonlinear operations 
haore generally, we can consider monotone (but not necessarily linear) operations 
4 : P[O]” + P[O]. We will only require two unary nonlinear operations shown in 
Fig. 3. 
These functions are cli-ariy monotone. We have denoted them by the quantifier 
symbols because they cm be read as Sante and all, i.e., ‘some run of the experiment 
succeeds’ and ‘all runs of the experiment succeed’. We could also read them as may 
and must, since 3 is the closure which picks out P&D] as a subdomain of P&0] 
(i.e., ignoring must information and only retaining may information) while V is the 
projection which picks out &[O] as a subdomain of P&0] (ignoring may informa- 
tion and only retaining must information). 
We are now ready to introduce the syntax of tests. We have a syntactic category 
T of test expressions, tanged over by t. 
t::=SUCCfFAIL]atIa’t]EtI tl A t21 t, v t,lVtl3t. 
For the ‘semantics’ of tests, we define a function 0 : T x Q + P[O] such that 0( t, p) 
A 1 T 
-I-- 1 1 1 T 1 T 
(1) {LT) (7-1 
0) 0) U) 
(1) {L T) (1, T) 
0) 
Fig. 1. 
Fig. 2. 
Fig. 3. 
-A-=- 
1 
T I 
w 
(0 
(1, Tl 
{T) 
1 T 
T T 
(1) {LT) (7-1 
(1) {LT) IT) 
b,T) i&T) {T) 
IT) 1-r) {T) 
(LT) {T) I IT) 1-r) 
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is the set of possible outcomes of a test t performed on a process p, 
asucc, P) = m 
O(FAIL, P) = UL 
O(t, A t*,p)= W,,ph WhPL 
ow, PI = VW, PA 
0(3t, p) = 30(4 Ph 
Remark. Lemma 3.2 is needed to show that the clauses for at, a’? are well-defined. 
We now provide some discussion of these testing contructs, which fall naturally 
into five groups: 
(1) Traces: SUCC, FAIL, at. This fragment of the language of tests just comprises 
strings of the form u1 . . . a,SUCC or Q, . . . Q, FAIL (n a 0). However, even here 
there is more to testing than just the set of traces in the sense of ‘the language 
accepted by the process’ (which would correspond to using the Hoare powerdomain 
for our domain of outcomes). For example, we can distinguish &NIL+ cNIL) 
from abNIL+acNIL (cf. [S]) since 
O(abSUCC, a(bNIL+ cNIL)) = {T}, 
O(abSUCC, &NIL+ UCNIL) = {I, T}. 
(2) Refusals: &t (cf. [lo]). The addition of refusals allows the experimenter to 
use finitely obtainable information about the failure to perform some action. (In 
terms of the discussion in [9], this is ‘the green light going off after we press the 
u-button’.) The definition of p ref a ensures that p determinately refuses a, and no 
possible future actions or ‘improvement of information’ can change this fact. It 
should be up to the experimenter whether this state of affairs comprises uccess or 
failure; hence the introduction of a”t alongside at. 
(3) Epsilon: E?. This corresponds to a form of nondeterminism.in the test, of a 
kind already present in De Nicola- ennessy testing (e.g., with Et = px. t +-TX). 
However, we allow the nondeterminacy to ounded by the process in the sense 
that if the process is convergent, and hence 
then we will eventually proceed to test t. n terms of [9], this could be implemented 
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by the following ‘procedure’. Flip a coin. If the green light has gone off, or the coin 
falls heads, proceed to the remainder of the test t. Otherwise, repeat. 
(4) Copying: t, A f2, I t v t2. De Nicola-Hennessy testing implies the ability to 
make copies of the machine in its initial state. If we extend this idea to allow copies 
to be made at intermediate points in a test, then we need some idea of performing 
separate tests on the copies, and then combining the information from the outcomes 
of the subtests in some way to obtain an outcome of the overall test. We formalise 
this in terms of monotone operators f: 0” + Q (monotonicity guaranteeing that we 
combine information in a computable fashion), which are then pointwise extended 
to $ : P[Q]” -) P[O] where the multilinearity corresponds to the intuition that each 
subtest is independent. This seems to be the simplest model of pure copying, and at 
the same time a rather comprehensive and mathematically natural one. Our choice 
of the particular operators A, v is motivated by the desire to have a minimal complete 
set; this point will be taken up in Section 5. 
(5) Global testing: Vt, 3 t. The use of linear operators as in (4) preserves the local 
character of De Nicola-Hennessy testing, and also of tests based on (l)-(3). That 
is, information is obtained independently on each possible run of the test, and only 
collected as a whole ‘at the end’. 7% is not suficient for observation equivalence. 
We need to be able, at some point inside a test, to enumerate UN runs of some 
subtest. The information gathered from this enumeration can still be combined in 
a computable way; this is the force of the monotonicity of W and 3. However, the 
ability to.do the enumeration in the first place may be taken as objectionable, not 
so much on the grounds of effectiveness, as the results in [9] and those in the present 
paper show, as on the grounds that we are in some way making what should be 
unobservable observable. 
In more detail, what seems to be required is the ability to enumerate all (of finitely 
many) possible ‘operating environments’ at each stage of the test, so as to guarantee 
that all nondeterministic branches will be pursued by various copies of the subject 
process- Information about the various outcomes of the test on these copies can 
then be combined by a standard dovetailing construction. This is of course exactly 
the point of the ‘weathers’ in [9]. 
The extent to which global testing is really acceptable clearly needs further 
discussion. The present paper aims to place the cards on the table as a basis for 
such a discussion. Our development to date already suggests quite a few possibilities 
for imposing a coherent structure on testing, with many natural intermediate points, 
e.g.: 
(i) traces: ( l), 
(ii) traces+refusals: (l)+(2) (+ ‘duals’-cf. [lo]), 
(iii) traces + pure copying: ( 1) + (4), 
(iv) traces + refusal + pure copying: (1) + (2) + (4), 
etc. Our results in Section 5 will give strong evidence that our notion of testing is 
at the fop of the lattice of reasonable testing notions since it suffices to characteke 
okrvational equivalence, and is also ‘operator complete’. 
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4. Testing: operational formulation 
In this section, we shall introduce a transition system 
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to describe how the 
evaluation of test outcomes may be implemented in a step-by-step fashion. This 
will also make the computational intuitions appealed to in the previous section 
somewhat more explicit. 
We shall be making two additional assumptions on the basic transition system B 
we are working over: 
(i) B is image-finite; 
(ii) to = 0, i.e., pr (in the derived transition system D) if! p +f Y 
6f these, (i) appears essential if we are to keep the system on a finitary basis (and 
is made in [9]). However, (ii) is merely a minor technical convenience to keep the 
definions a little simpler. 
The conjfgurations or states of the transition system we shall specify will be 
experiment expressions, with the following syntax: 
E::=T(Il(t(p)(E, A E*IE, v E*(VE/3E 
Here T, _I_ represent finite outcomes of tests; t 1 p, for t a test, p a process, represents 
‘application’ of a test to a process (the notation follows [SJ and [lo] here); E, A E2, 
El v E2, VE, 3E represent he evaluation of operator over the (outcomes of) 
subexperiments. 
We shall define a transition relation + over experiment expressions. This relation 
will have the following important properties: 
(i) + is image-finite, i.e., VE. (E’I E + E’} is finite, 
(ii) E+c~E=TvE=L. 
Definition. S,(E) = {E’l E + E’}. 
The transition relation 
and rules: 
(1) SUcclp+T 
(3) (i) ’ +“’ 
atIp+afip’ 
(4) (i) p+Tp’ 
Gzlp+ &lp’ 
(5) (i) ’ _*“I 
et)p+dlp 
+ is defined to be the least satisfying the following axioms 
(2) FAIL(~+L 
(ii) P*aP’ (iii) 
prefb 
atlP+tlP’ atlp+l 
(ii) P+aPt (iii) 
prefa 
4% Ip+ tip’ a’rlp+T 
(ii) ~f(p-* t (p 
(6) (i) tl A CLIP + ~JPA AP 
(ii) 
Ep E; Ep E; 
E,AE,+E;AE$ 
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(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(iii) 
(4 
(i? 
ii) 
(iii) 
(4 
(iI 
(ii) 
(iv) 
(9 
(ii) 
(iv) 
s. Y 
(iv) J, A iti -5 
EAT-E 
now use ihis transition syste 
test on 8 process. 
efinititm. R& p) = (T I( 
ee 
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nitio .2. The depih of a test t E , is ned as follows: 
d(SuCC) = d(FAIL) = 0, 
d(at) = d(a’t) = d(st) = I +d(t), 
d(t, A tz) = d(t, v tz) = max{d&), d(Q), 
d(Vt) = d(3) = d(t), 
d(OP(t ,,..., t’,))=max{d(t,)~l~i~n}. 
5.3. We T’Vn>d(t).Vp,qEQ. 
By induction on the structure of t. The cases for WCC, FAIL are trivial. 
For cases of the form t = OP(t 1,. . . , tn) (including tl A tZ, tl v tz,Vt,, 3t,), by 
induction hypothesis, 0( tj, p) c 0( ti, q), 1 G i G n; hence, by monotonicity of 
op, Q(OP( ?I, . . . , t,), $4 = opoxt,, PA l l l 3 at*, PmJPww, 9 4), l l l 9 wll, 4)) = 
Q(OP( t 1,..*,t?Arq). 
For t = & , suppose T E O(&, , p). Then, Gtk 
(i) p*“p’ and TE O(t,,p’), or 
(ii) p 3 p’ and p’ ref Q, 
In case (i), 0 < d(t) < n and p C, q implies 
q+aq’ and p’~,,_, q’, whered(t,)cn-1. 
By induction hypothesis, O(t,, p’)c- 0( t,, q’); hence T E Ott,, q’), and so TE 
Wt,, 9) 
In case (ii), OC d(t) c n and p C” q implies q =Y q’ and p’ c,_, q’, with 0~ n - 1. 
en pi ref a implies p’J implies (I): q’&, and (II): p’ a” implies q’ aa. Hence, by 
emma 3.2, 3q’. q’S q” and q” ref a. Thus, q S q’ and q’ ref a; hence, T E 
) in this case, too. 
pose I E 0(&t,, q). Then, either (i): pf, in which case d, E O(iit, , p), or 
, in this case, I E O(iit, , q) implies q aa q’ 
ut then implies p ,,p’ and p’ tn-, q’. By induction 
I E O(t,, p’), and so I E O(&, p). The 
tE T’. O(t,p)EO(t,q). 
is lemma tells us that, whatever monotone operators we add to our language 
d the observation preorder. In fact, a similar 
ent would show that we could add arbitrary functions f: P 
servation equivalence. 
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itio 
(T)” = SUCC, (F)* = FAIL, 
(4 Ax)* = (4)” A (XV, 
(bl+)* = vw4*, 
(bib)’ = wf#d*, 
(4 v x)* = w* v (x)*, 
U&b)* = 3&b)*, 
wdd* = WP). 
Emma 5.6. V6, E HML. ‘dp E Q. 
and 
P I= @ e Ott&*, P) ={T) 
Proof. By induction on the structure of 4. The cases for T, I are trivial. For 4 A x, 
i$i v x note that we are coding imih of the satisfaction relation by (T) and fahity 
by {I) and A, v have their standard truth-table definitions on these singleton sets. 
Case [a]& 
(i) p I= [a]4 e pJ & Vp’. p lap)3p’ I= 4 
H pi & VP’. p *“p’*o((d*, p) = IT) 
(by the induction hypothesis) 
H o(a’(b)*, P) = IT} 
e Vo(a”(#)*, P) = (T! 
e WMW, P) = i-T-)- 
(ii) p I# [a]4 H pt v 3~‘. p *“p’& p’if di 
H Pt v 3P’- P *a P’ & OWJ”, P’) = u-1 
@ ONal4)“, P) = w* 
Case (a)& 
e 3~‘. p *a p’ & O(( d)“, p’) = {T} 
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T E O(d#)*, P') 
30(44)*, p) = {T) 
O(((abb)*, P) = IT}- 
Qp’. p =+a pr *p’Bt 4 
Qp’. p *ap’*ab#d*, P’) = w 
(by the induction hypothesis) 
e 0(&Q”, P) = 01 
e ~WW”, PI = Ul 
e OuwP)*, P) = (U= 
The cases for [ ~14, (E)+ are similar. Cl 
m?flaftion § 3. The testing preorder is defined as follows 
pG’-q=QtE T. O(t,p)c_O(t,q). 
We are now ready to prove our main result. 
eorem 5.8 (Characterisation Theorem) 
Vp,q@. pz”q C2 ptTq. 
roof. By Corollary 5.4, p EO q+p ~~ q. 
For the converse, 
P ET q * WJ E ~-ML. OW”, p)c o(W*, q) 
* Aff(p)~Aff(q) by Lemma 5.6. 
+ p GO q by the Modal Characterisation Theorem. Cl 
5.9 (Operator Completeness of T). Extension of T by any set of monotone 
operators does not increase the power of testing since 
pCTq e p!zT’q. 
Clearly, p 5 *p GT q. Furt 
c” 
f’ by Corollary 5. 
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ce 
Our definitions in Section 2 followed [9] closely. In particular, we defined 
observable action by 
(*) p*“q = p+**+aq 
instead of the more usual 
(**) p*aq s p4T*+a4T*q_ 
Our aim in this section is to show that we can develop just as satisfactory a treatment 
of testing based on (**) as we did for (*), protded that we modify the definition 
of divergence appropriately. 
It will be convenient for this purpose to use a more refined notion of divergence 
in transition systems, also described in 191. A system (Q, A, 8, ‘/ ) is a transition 
system with local divergence if I’ c Q x A is a binary relation between processes and 
actions. We write pfa for (p, a) E t, and p&a for 1( pfa). We modify the definition 
of the observation preorder at the inductive step to: 
P sJ+14 = VaeA. 
(VP’. p +a p’*3q’. q +a q’ & p’ Cn q’ 
(9 94a k 
(ii) Vq’. q +” q’*3p’. p +a p’ & p’ 5,q’). 
The definition of the satisfaction relation for HML has the clause for [ a]4 amended 
to 
P I= Cal+ = pJa & Vp'. p +ap’*p’ I= 4. 
The Modal Characterisation Theorem still 1 ‘ds with these modified definitions. 
Now given a basic transition system B = (Q, A u {T}, So, to) (with global diver- 
gence) as before, we define the derived system D = (Q, A u {E}, 6, I’) as follows: 
psq = p+T*q, 
p*“q G p4T*4a4r*q, 
PT& = (3p’. p *F p’ & p’T()) v p 4”, 
Pta = pf& v (3p’. p *,p’ 
retation is not the 0 tio 
system-appears in [12].) 
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The denotational formulation of testing in this setting only requires amendment 
to the clauses for 0( at, p), O(Gt, p), O(E~, p). These become 
The operational formulation of testing only requires amendment to rules (3)(ii) 
and (4)(ii) in the definition of the transition system. These become 
P -*OP’ P +aP’ 
Qtlp+&tlp’ Gtip’&tip’ 
respectively. 
Theorem 4.1 and all the results in Section 5 still hold under these amended 
definitions, with only routine modifications to the proofs. 
Why did we introduce the more refined notion of divergence ~fa? A more 
straightforward approach would have been to simply change the definition of p +a q 
to (**), while keeping the global notion of divergence unchanged. The problem 
with this ‘straightforward approach’ is that it smuggles in a hidden fairness assump 
tion, which destroys the effective character of testing. To clarify this point, we need 
some general notions. 
We can formulate two basic axioms for testing: 
(Al) If a test succeeds, it must do so in finite time (thus excluding, e.g., testing 
for divergence). 
(A2) Only a finite amount of information about the subject process can be 
elicited by a test in a finite period of time (excluding, e.g., ‘Zeno testing’). 
From these axioms, we can derive the following principle: 
(P) If a test t succeeds on a process p, it must do so on the basis of a finite 
amount of information about p. 
This can be formulated in more mathematical terms as 
(C) Tests are continuous in their process arguments. 
It can in fact be shown that the notions of testing developed in this paper are 
continuous in a precise sense; we shall not elaborate on that here. However, we 
can make the point that the naive approach to interpreting +a by (**) leads to an 
evidently discontinuous notion of testing (and thus violates (Al) or (A2)). This can 
be illustrated by the following example. 
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Example. Define p. = 0, pn+l = cNIL+T~~ (in CCS with ‘partial terms’, cf. e.g., 
[5, lo]). Then the sequence {p,} forms a chain in the syntactic ordering, with 
Un ap* = a(U,p,) = ap = a(px. cNIL+Tx). 
Now, consider the test = V6 3c SUCC (i.e., the translation of the HML formula 
[a](c)T). Under the definitions of the naive approach, 
Vn. O(f, ap”) = (I} but O(f, ap) = {T}. 
Note that with our original definitions based on (*), 0( r, ap,,) = {T} (n 2 I), while 
with the modified definitions given at the start of this section, 0( t, ap) = {I}. 
As a further indication of the mismatch of concepts in the naive approach, note 
that under it we have p I# [e](c)T (since pf ), but ap I= [ a]( c)T (since ap&) while 
ap I# [a][&](cjT (since pf ); and hence [ a][&]# is not in general equivalent o [a]&, 
which we would expect with (**) in force. 
Note that with the definitions given at the start of this Section, this equivalence 
does indeed hold. 
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